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in The afTermaTh of world war ii, the United States played a crucial role in establishing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations and was a true champion of international justice. In 
subsequent years, however, U.S. conduct concerning the ICJ’s 
decisions that directly affect its interests has been far from 
exemplary. The most recent instance was the refusal of the U.S. 
Supreme Court to domestically enforce the ICJ’s 2004 judgment 
in the Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United 
States)1 case. The present note seeks to highlight recent interna-
tional developments with regard to this case and to analyze the 
manner in which the ICJ dealt with the June 5, 2008 Mexican 
request for interpretation of the Avena judgment. The June 2008 
request gave rise to fresh proceedings that are commonly known 
as the Medellín case.2
conSular notiFication and the AvenA caSe: 
BackGround
In Avena, the ICJ analyzed the situation of a group of Mexican 
citizens tried and sentenced to death in several U.S. states with-
out access to the assistance of the competent Mexican consuls, 
as provided in Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (VCCR).3 The Mexican government’s claim 
was not directed at the penalty imposed on those individuals, but 
rather at the fact that U.S. authorities failed to inform them of 
their right to consular assistance when they were detained and 
prosecuted. Mexico’s counsel argued that this information could 
have made a difference in the manner in which the trials were 
conducted before state courts. The ICJ, thus, had to resolve the 
issue of whether the U.S. government breached VCCR’s Article 
36, and if so, whether it was bound to provide a remedy to the 
Mexican government.
In a March 31, 2004 judgment, the ICJ found that the United 
States had effectively breached its obligations owed to the 
Mexican government under Article 36. The Court further held 
that:
[t]he appropriate reparation in this case consists in the 
obligation of the United States of America to provide, 
by means of its own choosing, review and reconsider-
ation of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican 
nationals . . . by taking account both of the violation of 
the rights set forth in Article 36 of the Convention and 
of paragraphs 138 to 141 of this Judgment.4
In this decision, the ICJ generally followed the LaGrand case 
(Germany v. United States), decided in 2001, where essentially 
the same questions were at issue.5 In particular, the Court reaf-
firmed its landmark ruling in LaGrand, holding that Article 36 
creates individual rights that the detained person’s country can 
invoke in the ICJ under the jurisdictional clause contained in the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention.6 
the medellín caSe: mexico returnS to the icJ
While in principle, the Avena case came to an end with the 
delivery of the 2004 judgment, the Mexican government filed 
a new application before the ICJ on June 5, 2008, prompted by 
the failure of U.S. courts to implement that decision. At this 
stage, the primary issue between Mexico and the United States 
was the practical execution of the March 31, 2004 judgment, a 
matter governed by Article 94 (2) of the United Nations Charter. 
Pursuant to this provision, a state party to a case is free to resort 
to the UN Security Council if the other party “[f]ails to perform 
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by 
the Court.” This is the road that the Mexican government may 
have taken, like Nicaragua did in 1986 in the aftermath of the 
celebrated decision by the ICJ in the Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua case. A fundamental les-
son from Nicaragua, however — one from which the Mexican 
government likely learned — is that the existence of the veto 
power may render this remedy largely ineffective when the 
defaulting party is a permanent member of the Security Council. 
With this in mind, it is understandable that the Mexican govern-
ment decided to avoid taking the route of the Security Council 
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its case as a request for interpretation of the 2004 judgment, a 
matter on which the ICJ possesses jurisdiction under Article 60 
of its Statute.
On the other hand, these cases are highly illustrative of the 
interplay between international law and domestic law, which 
is particularly interesting in the case of federal states. Indeed, 
Avena and Medellín underscore some of the complex questions 
of compliance with rules of international law faced by a coun-
try like the United States, where state criminal law matters are 
handled in state courts and only reach federal courts in excep-
tional circumstances. In this context, a remarkable aspect of 
these cases is that, after the delivery of the ICJ’s 2004 decision 
in Avena, the executive branch made a deliberate and unprec-
edented attempt to give domestic legal effect to a decision by the 
ICJ, only to have that action later reversed by the judiciary. 
On February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush issued a 
memorandum to the Attorney General in which he stated that 
the United States would discharge its international obligations 
under the ICJ’s decision in Avena “[b]y having State courts give 
effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of 
comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in 
that decision.”7 The U.S. Supreme Court determined on March 
25, 2008, however, that the memorandum did not create legal 
rules whose enforcement could be imposed on Texas courts. 
The Supreme Court further held that the decisions of the ICJ do 
not constitute federal law and are, therefore, not enforceable by 
federal courts against a state.8 To be fair, the Supreme Court duly 
acknowledged that in the field of international law, the United 
States is bound by the decisions of the ICJ in cases to which it 
is a party. It also stressed, however, that the execution of those 
decisions as a matter of federal law requires a statute enacted by 
Congress and not executive action by the administration. 
Facing this situation and having Texas authorities set the 
date for the execution of José Ernesto Medellín and four other 
Mexican nationals covered by the Avena decision, the Mexican 
government applied anew to the ICJ. In addition to its request 
for interpretation of the Avena decision, the Mexican govern-
ment filed an urgent request for provisional measures under 
Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. While requests for this type of 
interim relief are a frequent feature of litigation before the ICJ, 
this is the first time in ICJ history that provisional measures 
have been requested in a case that has formally ended and in 
which the construction of one of the ICJ’s judgments is being 
requested.
the court’S reSponSe (i):  
the reQueSt For interpretation
The ICJ replied swiftly to the Mexican government’s request, 
undoubtedly because the lives of several individuals on death 
row, whose executions were imminent, were at stake. After oral 
proceedings organized in a matter of weeks, on July 16, 2008, 
the ICJ issued an order which imposed on the United States the 
duty to “take all measures necessary” to ensure that the five 
Mexican nationals covered by the request for interpretation, 
including Medellín, were not executed pending judgment.9
The U.S. government contended that the request for inter-
pretation should be dismissed in limine due to a “manifest lack 
of jurisdiction” because there was no “dispute as to the meaning 
or scope of the judgment,” as stipulated in Article 60 of the ICJ 
Statute, between the United States and Mexico. According to 
the U.S. government, the real problem pertained to the imple-
mentation of the judgment in Avena and not to the judgment’s 
construction. Moreover, counsel for the United States argued 
that the problem was rooted in the U.S. courts’ adoption of the 
position that the ICJ’s decisions are not directly enforceable as 
a matter of federal law. 
From a procedural point of view, this preliminary question 
did not actually refer to the jurisdiction of the ICJ to interpret 
its own decisions, but rather, to the admissibility of the Mexican 
government’s request for interpretation. The ICJ’s jurisdiction 
in the matter of interpretation has a solid basis in Article 60 
of the ICJ’s Statute and, as the ICJ pointed out in its July 16, 
2008 order, “[it] is not preconditioned by the existence of any 
other basis of jurisdiction as between the parties to the original 
case.”10
As to the question of admissibility, the ICJ made a finding 
in favor of Mexico. The ICJ analyzed Article 60 of its Statute 
and discovered the existence of a discrepancy between the 
English and French versions of that provision. Specifically, the 
term “dispute” used in the English version is rendered in the 
French version as “contestation” rather than “différend.” This 
distinction is significant because “différend ” is the term used in 
other provisions of the Statute where reference is made to legal 
disputes, such as the well-known provisions of Article 36(2) or 
Article 38. The Court found that “[t]he term ‘contestation’ is 
wider in scope than the term ‘différend ’ and does not require 
the same degree of opposition”; that “[c]ompared to the term 
‘différend,’ the concept underlying the term ‘contestation’ is 
more flexible in its application to a particular situation”; and 
that “[a] dispute (‘contestation’ in the French text) under Article 
60 of the Statute, understood as a difference of opinion between 
the parties as to the meaning and scope of a judgment rendered 
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by the Court…does not need to satisfy the same criteria as 
would a dispute (‘différend ’ in the French text) as referred to 
in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.”11 On the basis of 
these general propositions, advanced for the first time in this 
order, the Court concluded that there was indeed a “difference 
of opinion” between the parties on the scope and meaning of the 
2004 judgment and that, therefore, the request for interpretation 
was admissible.
It must be stressed, however, that the ICJ decided in favor 
of the admissibility of the request for interpretation by a tight 
majority (7 votes against 5). This demonstrates that several 
members of the Court share the opinion that this case does not 
refer to the interpretation of the 2004 judgment at all but rather to 
its implementation  — a matter on which neither the UN Charter 
nor the ICJ Statute highlights any role for the Court itself. 
the court’S reSponSe (ii):  
interim protection
As for the request for provisional measures, the case is of 
particular interest to those who follow the work and procedure 
of the ICJ because of the manner in which the Court approached 
the question of jurisdiction. In general, before the Court exam-
ines the conditions required for the exercise of its powers under 
Article 41 of its Statute, it considers whether it has “prima facie 
jurisdiction” with regard to the merits of the case in whose 
context the request for interim protection is made. This is a 
jurisdictional test that has no statutory basis but has been devel-
oped exclusively on the basis of the ICJ’s jurisprudence since 
the mid-seventies. It is now firmly established that “[i]n deal-
ing with a request for provisional measures the Court need not 
[have] jurisdiction on the merits of the case, but [the Court] will 
not indicate such measures unless there is prima facie basis on 
which the jurisdiction of the Court might be established.”12 
 In the case at hand, because the request for interim relief 
related to the requested interpretation of the 2004 judgment 
rather than the merits of the case, the ICJ flatly ignored the prima 
facie test of jurisdiction. It concentrated instead on ascertaining 
whether the conditions for the admissibility of the request for 
interpretation were fulfilled, a question that is technically and 
conceptually different from that of jurisdiction.
After determining that the threshold of admissibility in 
Article 60 of the Statute was met, the ICJ inquired whether the 
remaining conditions necessary for the indication of provisional 
measures were satisfied in the case at hand. Put simply, these are 
the criteria developed through the Court’s jurisprudence: 
 (a)  Whether a link exists “[b]etween the alleged rights the 
protection of which is the subject of the provisional 
measures being sought, and the subject of the principal 
request submitted to the Court.”13 
(b)  Whether there is a risk of an “[i]rreparable prejudice to 
be caused to rights which are the subject of a dispute in 
judicial proceedings”;14 and
(c)  Whether there is “[u]rgency in the sense that action prej-
udicial to the rights of either party is likely to be taken 
before the Court has given its final decision.”15
The majority of the ICJ concluded that the request submitted 
by the Mexican government fulfilled these criteria. Therefore, 
the ICJ found that “the circumstances require that it indicate 
provisional measures to preserve the rights of the Mexican gov-
ernment, as Article 41 of its Statute provides.”16
the QueStion oF the leGal eFFectS oF  
orderS on proViSional meaSureS
An altogether different matter is that of compliance with 
the provisional measures indicated by the Court. The Breard 
case (Paraguay v. United States) submitted in 1998 and later 
discontinued, and the LaGrand case, both concerned persons 
sentenced to death whose right to timely consular assistance had 
not been respected by U.S. authorities. In both, the ICJ indicated 
provisional measures which the United States openly ignored, 
resulting in the executions being carried out as planned.17 It is 
important to note, however, that at the time these cases were 
decided, the ICJ’s law and practice was not entirely clear as to 
the legal effects of the orders on provisional measures. After 
all, provisional measures orders are not ICJ judgments and are, 
therefore, not expressly covered by the force of res judicata 
provided for in Article 94 of the United Nations Charter. 
The Court erased all doubt about the legal effect of provi-
sional measures with the LaGrand case. When this case reached 
the merits stage, Germany included in its final submissions a 
request that the ICJ declare that the United States violated not 
only the VCCR, but also its international obligation to comply 
with the ICJ’s previous order on provisional measures. In its 
judgment of June 27, 2001, the ICJ found in favor of Germany 
on this aspect of the case and, in doing so, put to rest the long-
standing doctrinal controversy about the legal effect of provi-
sional measures.18 As a result, today there can be no doubt that 
under international law orders by the ICJ indicating provisional 
measures are legally binding and, consequently, lack of compli-
ance by one of the states to which they are addressed is in viola-
tion of that state’s international responsibility.
 
proSpectS
On August 5, 2008 Texas authorities executed Medellín, the 
first of the Mexican nationals covered by the ICJ’s July 16, 2008 
order on provisional measures. In light of this development, it 
is foreseeable that, in connection with its pending request for 
interpretation of the 2004 judgment, the Mexican government 
will request a formal finding on lack of compliance with its 
order and some form of remedy from the ICJ. It remains to be 
seen how the ICJ will approach this issue in its judgment on the 
interpretation of the Avena decision, which very likely will be 
delivered before the end of 2008.19
From the standpoint of international law, the ICJ has found 
that its orders on provisional measures have binding effect and 
create international legal obligations with which the parties to a 
case before it are required to comply. There is thus no escape 
from the conclusion that Medellín’s execution represents an 
internationally wrongful act on the part of the United States, 
giving rise to its international responsibility vis-à-vis the state 
of Mexico. 
It is certainly regrettable that U.S. authorities have not found 
a way to ensure compliance with the ICJ’s orders on provisional 
measures as a matter of federal law. Furthermore, as this situ-
ation might recur in connection with any future case involving 
the United States that is brought before the ICJ, the U.S. govern-
ment should push for Congress to pass implementing legislation 
to give domestic effect to ICJ decisions, including orders for 
provisional measures.
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In the long run, one could argue that lack of compliance 
with the ICJ Statute is harmful for the United States itself, for it 
seriously weakens its commitment to the judicial settlement of 
disputes and, more generally, to the principles enshrined in the 
UN Charter. When the United States has appeared before the 
ICJ in the past it has made full use of the Court’s procedures — 
including provisional measures — to vigorously demand from 
other States compliance with the rules of international law. The 
1979–1981 U.S. Hostages in Tehran case provides a powerful 
example.20 In stark contrast, the next time the United States 
appears before the ICJ, either as an applicant or as a respondent, 
its attitude with regard to the Avena and Medellín cases will 
certainly loom large. If for instance, the United States finds it 
expedient to request from the Court the indication of provisional 
measures of protection, the opposite party will have a powerful 
argument to undermine the United States’ standing before the 
Court and to question the authenticity of its commitment to the 
rule of law in international affairs.  HRB
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